The Creative Work Processes of Professional Economists by Mackinnon, Lauchlan
Copyright © Lauchlan Mackinnon 2005 
Email Lmackinnon@ozemail.com.au | Ph. 0402 141 131 
1 
Chapter II – the creative work processes of economists 
 
 
 
Author:  
Lauchlan Mackinnon 
PhD Student 
Departments of Economics and Philosophy 
The University of Queensland 
St. Lucia Campus, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia 
 
Contact  
Email: lmackinnon@ozemail.com.au  
Phone: 0402 141 131 
 
 
This is a DRAFT of a chapter that is proposed for inclusion in my doctoral thesis. 
 
 
All constructive comments and feedback very much appreciated 
 
 
 
Please do not cite, excerpt from or use without prior written permission 
 
 
Copyright © Lauchlan Mackinnon 2005 
 
 
Copyright © Lauchlan Mackinnon 2005 
Email Lmackinnon@ozemail.com.au | Ph. 0402 141 131 
2 
 
Chapter IV – the creative work process of economists .......................................................1 
Introduction......................................................................................................................3 
Dominant models of the creative process ........................................................................4 
The Wallas stage model...............................................................................................5 
An overview of the Wallas stage model..................................................................5 
Further aspects of the stage model of the creative process......................................7 
Clarification of the creative goals during ‘preparation’ ......................................7 
Rational and intuitive creative work ....................................................................8 
Creative rhythm .................................................................................................10 
Overlapping stages.............................................................................................10 
Critiques of the stage model ..................................................................................11 
The stage model and the creative work processes of economic theorists..............11 
The Wertheimer productive thinking model..............................................................15 
An overview of the Wertheimer productive thinking model.................................15 
Critical reflections on the Wertheimer productive thinking model.......................18 
The Wertheimer productive thinking model and economists: a case study of Léon 
Walras ....................................................................................................................19 
Conclusions ....................................................................................................................24 
References......................................................................................................................26 
 
Copyright © Lauchlan Mackinnon 2005 
Email Lmackinnon@ozemail.com.au | Ph. 0402 141 131 
3 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of the present chapter is to investigate the genesis and development of 
economic ideas from the point of view of the creative work processes of economists.  
 
The starting point for the present considerations is the distinction between the ‘context of 
discovery’ and the ‘context of justification.’ Karl Popper was perhaps the first to 
distinguish between the intellectual genesis of a theory or proposition and its justification. 
Popper (1934/1965) wrote in his 1934 Logik der Forschung that: 
 
. . . the work of the scientist consists in putting forward and testing theories.  
The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me to neither to call 
for logical analysis nor be susceptible of it. The question of how it happens that a new idea 
occurs to a man – whether it be a musical theme, a dramatic conflict, or a scientific theory – 
may be of great interest to empirical psychology; but it is irrelevant to the logical analysis of 
scientific knowledge . . . Accordingly, I shall distinguish sharply between the process of 
conceiving a new idea, and the methods and results of examining it logically. (Popper 
1934/1965: 31) 
 
Hans Reichenbach  (1938) further articulated this distinction,  distinguishing between a 
“context of discovery” and a “context of justification”. While it would appear that Popper 
was the first to introduce the actual analytical distinction, the terminology of ‘context of 
discovery’ and ‘context of justification’ seems to have originated with Reichenbach. 
 
Popper chose to focus on the context of justification, suggesting that in the context of 
discovery that indeed ‘anything goes’1: there are no rules, and there is no necessary logic, 
to the process of discovery of ideas and hypothesis generation. Milton Friedman (1953) 
took a similar position in economics: 
 
Progress in positive economics will require not only the testing and elaboration of existing 
hypotheses but also the construction of new hypotheses. On this problem there is little to say 
on a formal level. The construction of hypotheses is a creative act of inspiration, intuition, 
invention; its essence is the vision of something new in familiar material. The process must 
be discussed in psychological, not logical, categories; studied in autobiographies and 
biographies, not treatises on scientific method; and promoted by maxim and exa mple, not 
syllogism or theorem. (Friedman 1953: 42-43) 
 
It is suggested that by and large, following Popper and Friedman, methodological works 
in the economics literature have not closely examined the context of discovery. The 
present chapter will attempt to remedy that deficit by focusing on the context of 
discovery with reference to the psychology of creativity literature, in particular with 
reference to the classic creative process models of Wallas (1926) and Wertheimer 
(1945/1961). Attempts will be made to relate those models the creative work processes of 
                                                 
1 Feyerabend (1978) of course claimed that anything goes in both the contexts of discovery and 
justification. Popper agreed with Feyerabend in the context of discovery, but disagreed in he context of 
justification. 
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professional economists and thereby assess the relevance of those models of the creative 
process for professional economists.  
Dominant models of the creative process  
 
Within economics, there has been little discussion of the creative process, either of the 
economic agent or of economists themselves. Austrian economists have advocated a 
process view of the economic system with agents demonstrating a degree of creativity in 
playing the role of the entrepreneur. There have been sporadic attempts to introduce a 
notion of creative economic man into the economics literature, such as John Foster (1987: 
137) for example introducing a homo creativus based on the behavioural view of 
economic man proposed by Tibor Scitovsky. There have however been few, if any, 
attempts by economists to take creative work processes, as understood in the psychology 
of creativity literature, seriously, or to relate them to an understanding of the economic 
agent.  
 
The present chapter attempts this task. The chapter naturally begins, therefore, with a 
review of the creative process as articulated in the psychology of creativity literature. 
 
The psychology of creativity literature, following Mooney (1963) and MacKinnon 
(1970), distinguishes between four aspects of the psychology of creativity: the creative 
person, the creative product, the creative process, and the creative environment. In other 
words, creativity may be viewed in terms of a particular creative person creating a 
particular creative product through some creative process in a particular creative 
environment, thereby giving rise to four related aspects to the study of creativity – the 
person, the product, the process and the environment.  
 
The creative process subset of the psychology of creativity literature is dominated by two 
models: the Wallas ‘stage’ model published by Graham Wallas (1926) in his Art of 
Thought, and the Wertheimer ‘productive thinking’ model, published by Max 
Wertheimer (1945/1961) in his Productive Thinking. Although these models may appear 
to be rather dated, they are still central to the modern understanding of the creative 
process. 
 
The psychology of creativity literature is of course a substantial literature, with many 
contributions from a variety of perspectives over a lengthy history. The categorization of 
the psychology of creativity literature into considerations of creative person, product, 
process and environment does not do justice to the diversity of viewpoints and 
contributions in the psychology of creativity literature. In particular, it should be noted 
that there are ‘confluence models’ straddling one or more of the categories proposed by 
Mooney and Mackinnon, such as the models proposed by Gruber (Gruber, Terrel et al. 
1962; Gruber 1974/1981; Gruber and Davis 1988; Gruber and Wallace 1989) and 
Csikszentmihalyi (1988; 1990; 1999). It does however present a convenient metaphor or 
filtering device through which to approach the literature and allow a convenient and 
tractable focus for the present discussion. Since the present interest is primarily in the 
creative process, rather than in issues such as the psychometric attempts to measure 
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creativity or identifying and studying cognitive mechanisms underlying creativity, much 
of the substantive work in the psychology of creativity literature is not of direct interest 
for the present purposes, and therefore beyond the scope of the present discussion. For a 
review of the psychology of creativity literature as a whole, the interested reader might 
however like to review the edited collections produced by Robert Sternberg (1988; 1999), 
for example the review article by Sternberg and Lubart (1999) reviewing the state of the 
psychology of creativity field circa 1999 and identifying ‘mystical,’ ‘pragmatic,’ 
‘psychodynamic,’ ‘psychometric,’ ‘cognitive,’ ‘social-personality,’ and ‘confluence’ 
approaches to the study of creativity. 
 
Given the interest in the creative process in the present chapter, the chapter begins with a 
review of the major historical models of the creative process – the Wallas and 
Wertheimer models - followed by a brief exploration of the models’ relevance to 
describing the creative work practices of professional economists.  
The Wallas stage model 
An overview of the Wallas stage model 
 
Wallas’s stage model of the creative process was motivated by classic testimonial 
accounts of the creative process from eminent scientists Hermann Ludwig Ferdinand von 
Helmholtz and Jules Henri Poincaré, and attempts to explain illumination and insight 
experiences in scientific work.  
 
Poincaré’s testimonial account is representative of the kind of insight and illumination 
described in stage model accounts of creative work processes: 
 
For 15 days I strove to prove that there could not be any functions like those I have since 
called the Fuchsian functions. I was then very ignorant; every day I seated myself at my work 
table, stayed an hour or two, tried a great number of combinations and reached no results. 
One evening, contrary to my custom, I drank black coffee and could not sleep. Ideas arose in 
crowds; I felt them collide until pairs interlocked, so to speak, making a stable combination. 
By the next morning I had established a whole class of Fuschian functions, those which come 
from the hypergeometric series; I had only to write out the results, which took but a few 
hours. (Poincaré 1908/1952) 
 
Poincarés productive work was marked therefore by an illumination experience which 
was preceded on the one hand by conscious preliminary work and succeeded by further 
conscious verification and elaboration. Wallas’s model attempted to explain the 
occurrence of such dramatic illuminations and insights in scientific or artistic work in 
terms of such preceding conscious work, followed by dramatic insight and further 
conscious veritification and articulation. Wallas proposed (like Poincaré himself) that the 
conscious preparatory work led to internalization of work on a problem into the 
subconscious, leading to some form or other of ‘subconscious’ processing of the problem, 
and eventually the subsequent (and potentially dramatic ) return to consciousness of new 
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insights, connections and associations, ideas or illuminations to consciousness. The 
Wallas stage model therefore involves four stages2: 
 
1. Preparation 
2. Incubation 
3. Illumination 
4. Verification and elaboration 
 
‘Preparation’ is conscious preparatory work on a problem, which involves attempts to 
engage with and (unsuccessfully) attempt to solve a problem or task. Preparation might 
involve initial engagement with and reformulation and restatement of a problem. 
Following this engagement, the problem becomes internalized. The problem is 
‘incubating’ in the subconscious, leading to (by some mechanism) a useful insight 
forming subconsciously and emerging, possibly quite dramatically, from the 
subconscious into conscious awareness as an ‘illumination’ or ‘insight.’ The insight is 
then verified for correctness and followed by further work to articulate and develop the 
insight. 
 
There is no shortage of testimonial evidence lending support to the Wallas stage model. 
Testimonial support is available from sources such as the original and eminent testimony 
from Poincaré (1908/1952) and Helmholtz (1896), from classic studies due to Platt and 
Baker (1931), Jospeph Rossman (1931), Catherine Patrick (1935; 1937; 1938), and Eliot 
Dole Hutchinson (1949), and from more recent studies such as Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi 
(1997). Platt and Baker and Rossman focused on providing testimonials from technical 
professionals : Platt and Baker focused on chemical engineers, while Rossman focused on 
individuals who had obtained large numbers of patents for technical inventions. 
Hutchinson surveyed a broad cross-sample of eminent scientists, artists and thinkers of 
the time. Csikszentmihalyi surveyed a number of eminent contemporary scientists and 
thinkers, including 14 Nobel Prize winners.  
 
Although the creative process literature tends to focus on the Wallas stage model, it 
should be noted that a variety of authors including Henri Poincaré (1908/1952), Carl Jung 
(1928), Joseph-Marie Montmasson (1931), Platt and Baker (1931), Joseph Rossman 
(1931), John Dewey (1934/1958), Eliot Dole Hutchinson (1949), Alex Osborn (1952) and 
Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi (1997) have proposed their own accounts of creative 
illuminations in the form of a stage model. Each of these stage models involves the same 
central idea: creative illuminations or insights are preceded by preparatory work, are 
followed by verification and elaboration, and involve some mechanism of non-conscious 
processing of the problem prior to the insight. The accounts differ however in their 
account of the non-conscious processing that occurs prior to illumination or insight 
                                                 
2 Wallas also identified an additional stage between incubation and illumination, termed ‘intimation’. 
Wallas essentially suggested that the conscious mind could be ‘aware’ that there was a solution on the way, 
that something was clicking in to place and that an insight is liable to break into consciousness as an 
illumination shortly. 
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experiences. Rossman for example is opposed to an explanation of illumination in terms 
of subconscious processes, as  
 
The assumption that the subconscious is responsible for the final solution is, however, no 
answer to the problem. It merely amounts to giving a name to a thing which mystifies and 
puzzles us. (Rossman 1931: 86) 
 
Rossman fails however to offer any credible alternative to subconscious mental 
processing, and the testimonials he collected supported - often very explicitly and in 
direct contrast to Rossman’s own views - a direct role for subconscious incubation and 
processing in the incubation stages before insight experiences.  
 
Similarly, Hutchinson’s stage model account of the creative process is psychodynamic in 
nature: for Hutchinson, the “intuitive thinker is often in a state of problem-generated 
‘neurosis’ or its lesser equivalent ‘tension’ owing to the practical block set to the 
immediate fulfillment of his creative desires.” Hutchinson views the “happy thought” or 
illumination as a catalyst or trigger for dissolving the neurosis or tension, leading to a 
restorative integration much along the lines of a words uttered by a therapist in a 
psychoanalytic context.  Hutchinson therefore replaces the stage of ‘incubation’ with a 
‘frustration’ stage.  
 
Osborn (1963) supported a similar concept of psychodynamic tension in the creative 
process: 
 
A clearer psychological explanation was put forward by Doctor Elliott Dunlap Smith: “If the 
knowledge of the inventor and the clues which will bring the invention into being have been 
brought nearly into position to provide the inventive insight, his inner tension will be strong . 
. . As he nears his goal he will become increasingly excited . . . It is no wonder that the 
sudden release of such inner tension is often describes as a ‘flash.’” (Osborn 1963, pp. 317-
318). 
 
Despite their considerable interest, it is beyond the scope of the present work to review 
the stage model accounts of Poincaré, Jung, Montmasson, Platt and Baker, Rossman, 
Dewey, Hutchinson, Osborn or Csikszentmihalyi in any detail3.  It is useful however to 
broaden the Wallas model by mentioning several themes introduced in the broader stage 
model literature. 
Further aspects of the stage model of the creative process 
Clarification of the creative goals during ‘preparation’ 
 
                                                 
3 These stage model theories were however researched in some detail during the preparation for this thesis. 
The material has been written up in considerable detail, however space considerations preclude including it 
here. Since I have been unable to find any contemporary text reviewing the stage and productive thinking 
creative process models in any depth, and since the stage and productive thinking models still form the core 
of the creative process literature in the psychology of creativity literature, it is to be hoped that it might be 
useful to publish this material separately as part of an overview book on the creative process literature. 
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Hutchinson (1949) and Csikszentmihalyi (1997) have noted that there may be a 
considerable degree of variation in the initial degree of clarity of the creative goals, and 
that often the actual creative process may be preceded by a prior process of articulating 
the goals or problem situation. Hutchinson for example wrote that: 
 
In many cases – more, I believe, in the arts than in science . . .the goal is defined only in 
general terms. So nebulous and unspecified are the means to that end, or the end itself, that 
the immediate task is not one of launching straightway into a period of efficient labor but 
rather of discovering some conception that can will serve as a starting point. Such a 
suggestive idea, keynote, or motif is merely a focal point for the work and is not yet fully 
representative of all the means of its attainment. (Hutchinson 1949, pp. 42-43) 
 
This theme is also articulated in the creative process literature by J. W. Getzels (1964; 
1976; 1977). 
Rational and intuitive creative work 
 
Creative process authors such as Poincaré (1908/1952), Platt and Baker (1931), 
Hutchinson (1949) and Jung (1928) have differentiated between two qualitatively 
different kinds of creative work process: one in which the work process is essentially a 
conscious and rational approach, involving application of existing knowledge and 
techniques in a more or less logical or systematic manner, and a second in which the 
work process becomes more deeply internalized and the subconscious engages with the 
problem tasks and contributes to the development of the work, leading to connections 
insights and illuminations beyond those the conscious mind might otherwise have made. 
In this latter case, insight experiences and intuitive jumps play a significant role.  
 
Analytic psychologist Carl Jung (1928) was one of the earliest to deliberately contrast 
these two different forms of creative work (in the context of considering the creative 
process in producing poetry or verse). Jung presented the first form of creative work: 
 
There are works, verse as well as prose writings, that proceed wholly from the author’s 
intention and resolve to produce this or that effect. In this case, the author submits his 
material to a definite treatment that is both directed and purposeful; he adds to it and 
subtracts from it, emphasizing one effect, modifying another, laying on the colour here, that 
there, with the most careful weighing of their possible effects, and with constant observance 
of the law of beautiful form and style. To this labour the author brings his keenest judgement, 
and selects his expressions with the most complete freedom. In his view the material is only 
material, and entirely subject to his artistic purpose; he wills  to present this and nothing else.  
. . . (Jung 1928: 234-235) 
 
There is however another class of creative works, where the author is moved by a 
creative force to do something ‘larger’ and ‘greater’ to what he or she might otherwise 
have conceived: 
 
Doubtless, also, I am saying nothing new when I speak of the other class of art-works, that 
flow more or less spontaneous and perfect from the author’s pen. They come as it were fully 
arrayed into the world, as Pallas Athene sprang from the head of Zeus. These works 
positively impose themselves upon the author; his hand is, as it were, seized, and his pen 
writes things that his mind perceives with amazement. The work brings with it its own form; 
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what he would add to it is declined, what he does not wish to admit is forced upon him . . . he 
is overwhelmed with a flood of thoughts and images which it was never his aim to beget and 
which his will would never have fashioned . . . He can only obey and follow the apparently 
foreign impulse, feeling that his work is greater than himself, and therefore has a power over 
him that he is unable to command. He is not identical with the process of creative formation; 
he is himself conscious of the fact that he stands as it were underneath his work, or at all 
events beside it, as thought he were another person who had fallen within the magical circle 
of an alien will. (Jung 1928: 235-236) 
 
Hutchinson similarly contrasted these two forms of creative work, and gave specific 
examples related to technical invention. For example, on the one hand Hutchinson cited 
Thomas Edison’s work process as an example of a systematic, deliberate approach to 
productive creative work, in this case involving testing of a range of hypotheses: 
 
. . . I want to tell you that all I have ever tackled and solved have been done by hard logical 
thinking . . . I speak without exaggeration when I say that I have constructed three thousand 
different theories in connection with electric light, each one of them reasonable and 
apparently likely to be true. Yet in two cases only did my experiments prove the truth of my 
theory. (Edison, quoted in Hutchinson 1949: 14) 
 
By contrast, an associate of Edison employed and described quite a different creative 
process: 
 
Then it came like a flash of lightning – not the Edison way (ie, by the progressive elimination 
of numerous hypotheses). On a Sunday evening I lay on my couch with a headache, smoking 
cigarettes. I tried to keep my  mind a blank; but after a year or more of being held down to my 
problem by Edison, I could no longer shut out the waxes, even in my sleep. And suddenly, 
through headache and daze, I saw the solution! True, the balanced chemical make-up of the 
Aylsworth wa x must not be disturbed. But by a physico-chemical process which instantly 
quickened in my mind, I could modify the intimate physical structure of the wax almost at 
pleasure, and thus bring about any desired change in hardness . . .  a positive solution to my 
despicable problem! 
I was restrained from rushing to the laboratory that evening. But the first thing next morning 
I was at my desk, and half an hour later I had a record in the softened wax cylinder . . . The 
acoustic production was correspondingly excellent . . . It was the solution! I had learned to 
think waxes, and the solution had come without effort, after a year of the Edisonian blind 
groping that had led nowhere. (M.A. Rosanoff, quoted in Hutchinson 1949: 23-24) 
 
We have, therefore, a spectrum of creative work ranging from more or less rational, 
deliberate and systematic projects and explorations to processes where subconscious 
processing of creative material plays, to a greater or lesser extent, a more significant role 
in the creative process. The difference between these two classes of creative work process 
is the extent to which the creative agenda and the creative context and background 
information are internalized into and processed by the subconscious mind, leading to the 
results of subconscious processing becoming available as illumination or insight 
experiences, new connections and associations, new interpretations and understandings, 
and evolving intuitions about productive directions to take in the creative work. 
 
It should not be imagined that any individual performs only rational, systematic work or 
only intuitive, inspired work. A given creative agent may produce both kinds of work at 
different times. Hutchinson for example quotes Sir James Irvine : 
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I can divide my ideas for scientific research into two groups. The best ideas are what I may 
call inspired. Then come ideas which are logically and mathematically evolved. These give 
rise to sound scholarly productions which cannot be compared in quality with those which 
are inspired. These latter appear at odd times and in unpredictable ways. (Sir James Irvine, 
quoted in Hutchinson 1949: 25) 
 
Similarly, the creative process may involve conscious and deliberate work on a creative 
project and/or for the involvement of the subconscious in the creative project, leading to 
intuitions, insights and illuminations guiding and enhancing the creative process. 
Creative rhythm 
 
Wallas (1926) noted a kind of ‘rhythm’ or ‘stroke’ to the creative process: in some parts 
of the creative process, for example in the preparation stage, deliberate and conscious 
efforts are required, while in other stages of the process, for example during incubation, 
similar efforts may actually get in the way of and impede the process. Each individual 
creative agent, and different creative projects for an individual, may therefore have a 
different natural creative ‘rhythm’ or ‘stroke’ that is productive for that agent, and 
knowing when to push and when to relax or pursue other lines of activity is an important 
skill in creative work.  
 
Alex Osborn, the inventor of brainstorming, suggested for example that “all along the 
way we must change pace. We push and then coast, and then push.” (Osborn 1963: 117)  
Overlapping stages 
 
Wallas has been criticized on the basis that he was supposed to have held that the 
proposed stages in the creative process were strictly linear and sequential. Eindhoven and 
Vinacke (1952) examined this issue experimentally4 in a study of the creative process in 
artists, and found it difficult to identify any clear breaks between the stages: 
 
. . . there was certainly no sharply defined break between preparation and incubation or 
illumination. (Eindhoven and Vinacke 1952: 161) 
 
Eindhoven and Vinacke conclude that: 
 
. . . the “stages” are not stages at all, but processes which occur during creation. They blend 
together and go along concurrently . . . Thus, it is far more meaningful and in better 
agreement with the facts to regard these alleged “stages” of creativity as aspects, or 
processes, of the complete dynamic pattern into which they are interwoven. Further studies 
might do well to carry further the kind of approach made here, that of observing and 
analysing the activities which occur, rather than basing analysis upon a rigid conception of 
four stages. (Eindhoven and Vinacke 1952: 161-162) 
                                                 
4 In considering Eindhoven and Vinacke’s work it must be noted that they defined preparation, incubation, 
illumination and verification differently to Wallas, for convenience in identifying these stages operationally 
in experimental conditions. This does not however affect the point made here relating to the relationship 
between the stages. 
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This point however should not be taken as a forceful criticism of Wallas’s model, as it is 
difficult to find anything in Wallas’s work, or in the testimonial material that Wallas’s 
model is built on, that asserts that the stages must be followed in a strictly linear fashion. 
Wallas’s stage model is entirely consistent with the idea that for example during 
incubation of one creative problem one might be doing vigorous preparatory work on 
another, separate, problem. 
Critiques of the stage model 
 
The stage model of the creative process has been critiqued by suggesting that the 
incubation-illumination stage model explanation is not necessary: instead the pure-
chance hypothesis (illumination experiences are the result of pure chance), the rest 
hypothesis (a refreshed mind after a break is more productive) and the forgetting 
hypothesis (after a rest, mental sets or predispositions acting as a barrier to success are 
dropped, facilitating creative success) may be proposed to explain creative progress after 
a period with a relaxed mind, away from the work.  
 
Jacques Hadamard (1945) summarised these hypotheses before rejecting them on a 
number of grounds. Most notably Hadamard argued that illumination insights typically 
showed evidence of internal processing that surprised the creative agent, and that such 
insights occurred under conditions of mental and physical exhaustion equally as much as 
in a fresh mind, and that insights usually struck the creative agent with a profound sense 
of harmony or aesthetic sensibility in a manner that a purely chance idea would not tend 
to accomplish. Following Hadamard’s criticisms of these hypotheses, it is difficult to 
accept these hypotheses as complete alternative explanations for illumination phenomena, 
but one may however readily accept these hypotheses as complementary aspects to the 
creative process, along with incubation and illumination phenomena. That is, in a given 
creative process, a rested mind and set unblocking may play a significant role in the 
creative work, or an illumination or insight might play a significant role, or factors of 
rest, set-unblocking and illumination may all play a part, but do not preclude the 
possibility or actuality of preparation, incubation, illumination and verification taking 
place. The hypotheses are not forceful criticisms of the stage model of the creative 
process. 
The stage model and the creative work processes of economic theorists 
 
It is useful to locate specific support for the stage model of the creative process in 
testimonial material sourced explicitly from practicing economists.  
 
There is however in general a paucity of testimonial material available from modern 
economists discussing their experiences in their creative work. Gerald Holton 
(1973/1988; 1978/1998) has suggested one explanation, in considering a similar 
reluctance in scientists. Holton distinguishes between ‘private’ and ‘public’ science and 
suggests that the motivations and metaphors that fuel the private passion of discovery are 
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often obscured in the final, formal and public presentation of the work to the scientific 
community. Holton suggested that  
 
Unless specifically urged, each [scientist] is likely to adopt in discussions of science the 
vocabulary and attitude of [public science], dry -cleaned of the personal elements. (Holton 
1973/1988: 9) 
 
This situation seems to be somewhat similar for economic scientists: there seems to be 
generally little discussion of the psychological journey or process of discovery leading to 
polished, formal theories or models: the motivating metaphors, dispositions and 
inspiration, the steps and mis-steps along the way, the events and dynamics in the 
process. In general the development of ideas - the context of discovery - seems to be kept 
private.  In addition to this general lack of testimonial material, there is an additional 
issue that, as noted by Hutchinson (1949) and Jung (1928) (considered above), creative 
work processes may vary on a spectrum between predominantly rational ‘Edisonian’ 
systematic creative work processes and more ‘intuitive’ processes involving incubation, 
guesses, and  illumination. One should not expect therefore that every economic scientist 
experiences illumination experiences: some individuals’ work processes may tend 
towards more systematic approaches with less likelihood of and occurrence of 
illumination experiences. It is, therefore, not to be expected that every economist will 
regularly experience insight and illumination experiences, or that even if they do, that 
they would necessarily publicly write about their psychological creative process and 
experience of conceiving and developing their creative work. One might expect on the 
basis of Holton’s observations regarding public science and the likelihood that real 
illumination experiences presumably only occur for a fraction of the community of 
professional working economists that little may have been written on illumination 
experiences, as indeed appears to be not far from the case5. 
 
Fortunately however, there is at least some useful testimonial material already readily 
available in the literature, giving a useful insight into the creative work processes of 
economists.  
 
To the extent that modern economics is a mathematical science, a broad level of 
testimonial support for the stage model for economists may be readily found, as 
testimonial material demonstrating the applicability of the stage model to work in 
mathematics and the physical sciences has been ongoing since Helmholtz (1896) and 
Poincaré (1908/1952). 
 
Perhaps the first explicitly economic support for the Wallas stage model comes from no 
less an eminent authority in economics than John Maynard Keynes, who apparently came 
                                                 
5 It would be useful to perform a survey of professional economists along the lines of the surveys done by 
Platt and Baker (1931), Rossman (1931), Hutchinson (1949), and Csikszentmihalyi (1997), examining the 
extent to which the Wallas and Wertheimer models reflect economists’ creative work processes and 
identifying other elements or aspects of the creative work process that they might consider significant. 
Time constraints precluded including such a survey with this dissertation, but it would make an interesting 
project after completion of the dissertation. 
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to a similar formulation to the Wallas model independently of Poincaré6, and certainly 
before Wallas. Keynes remarked in a 1906 article, entitled “Egoism,” that intuition is the 
result of an individual exercising their “mental muscles and by keeping his nose close to 
the stone” (O'Donnell 1989: 92). Keynes further articulates this in his 1909 paper 
“Science and art” where Keynes outlines a three-stage explanation of creative insight, 
similar to the Wallas stage model: the first step is to “perceive very clearly the details 
together clearly before his mind,” the second is then “with a sudden insight see through 
the obscur ity of the argument or of the apparently unrelated data, and the details will 
quickly fall into a scheme or arrangement, between each part of which there is a real 
connection,” where intuitions “arrive in a flash” after years of study (O'Donnell 1989: 92, 
101). The essential features of the Wallas stage model including stages of preparation and 
illumination are very clear in Keynes’s formulation. Other material suggests that Keynes 
quite clearly considered himself to experience incidents of illumination and insight 
consistent with his model and, by extension, the Wallas stage model. 
 
A second source for creative process testimonial material, drawn on extensively in the 
present discussion, is the material collated in Michael Szenberg’s Passion and Craft 
(1999). Szenberg solicits discussion of their creative work process from a number of 
eminent economists, and it is immediately clear from this material that there is a 
considerable degree of support for the stage model of the creative process.  
 
Avinash Dixit for example explicitly draws on the stage model of the creative process 
(albeit through the later, secondary source of Littlewood 1986 rather than directly 
through Wallas or Poincare) in advising how to proceed with creative work in economics: 
 
Having posed the question and worked on it for a while, give the subconscious a chance. 
Perhaps the best advice on this comes from the mathematician J. E. Littlewood, in his lovely 
article “The Mathematicians Art of Work.” He distinguishes four phases in creative work: 
preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification. “In preparation, [t]he essential 
problem has to be stripped of accidentals and brought clearly into view, all relevant 
knowledge surveyed; possible analogues pondered. It should be kept constantly before the 
mind during intervals of other work . . . Incubation is the work of the subconscious . . . 
Illumination, which can happen in a fraction of a second . . . almost always occurs when the 
mind is in a state of relaxation, and engaged lightly with ordinary matters.” (Dixit 1999: 76) 
 
Indeed, Dixit suggested this insight into the creative process was a kind of competitive 
advantage: 
 
Littlewood recommends “the relaxed activity of shaving” as a fruitful time for illumination; I 
shudder to think how much more David Kreps, Paul Krugman, and Lars Svensson would 
have accomplished if they had known this. (Dixit 1999: 76) 
 
Richard Schmalensee (1999) similarly identifies illumination experiences: 
 
                                                 
6 It is of course difficult to ascertain for certain the extent to which Poincaré’s thinking on creative work 
might have been known to Keynes. Keynes had a definite interest in mathematics and may well have read 
with great interest Poincaré’s more philosophical work as well. Further investigation of this point is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
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I have usually found that my subconscious mind is better than my conscious mind at solving 
problems that don’t yield to straightforward approaches. That is, on more than a few 
occasions the solution to a problem has come to me unbidden in the shower or in some other 
relaxed setting after I’ve ended a period of intense work on the problem. The solution to one 
problem (devising an index of competitive localization) that I had pursued intensively for 
several weeks came to me in the middle of a movie in the old Orson Welles theatre in 
Cambridge. If a moderate amount of intense effort doesn’t get me past an important 
intellectual barrier, I tend to take a break and work on something else – or nothing at all – for 
a while. (Schmalensee 1999: 252) 
 
Schmalansee also suggests that it is often hard to differentiate preparation stages clearly 
from more substantive work on a project: 
 
It is of course sometimes hard to separate project execution from topic winnowing. Figuring 
out whether a conjectured theoretical result is correct, for instance, may be both the logical 
first step after forming the conjecture and the hardest step in the whole project. (Schmalensee 
1999: 251) 
 
Like Carl Jung (1928), Schmalensee notes that this psychological process goes at its own 
pace and cannot be rushed: 
 
I am often frustrated at how long it takes to go from what seems to be final results to a 
completed manuscript, but whenever I try to rush this part of the process I am unhappy with 
the final product. (Schmalensee 1999: 251) 
 
Finally, Schmalansee notes a verification and elaboration stage: 
 
After the conceptually difficult work on a research project is apparently done, a lot of less 
interesting work is often required to clarify exactly what has been learned. In empirical 
analysis, this involves anticipating criticisms of both data and method and either reacting to 
them (perhaps by refining the data or employing additional tests or estimators), rebutting 
those criticisms, showing empirically or theoretically that they do not effect the main results, 
or limiting what is claimed. In theoretical work, this involves seeing which assumptions can 
be relaxed and making a case for the class of models and/or set of real situations to which the 
results are intended to apply. In both cases, it is necessary to make clear to readers exactly 
how the final product contributes to the relevant literature, and attempting to do this may 
suggest more work. (Schmalensee 1999: 252) 
 
Helpman (1999) focuses on describing long term research projects with significant end-
goals. For such long term projects it goes without saying that there is a high degree of 
preparation: indeed, initial and ongoing work on the project is preparation in the sense of 
the term in the stage model of the creative process. Helpman specifically identified an 
incubation stage in such creative processes: 
 
One has to get accustomed to the idea that months will pass with no visible progress. This 
does not necessarily mean that no progress has been made. Sometimes incubation periods for 
ideas are very long. Then, all we can write on our report cards is that we have been thinking 
but have no results to report. Nevertheless, these periods are not a waste of time; they are just 
part of the creative process. (Helpman 1999: 138) 
 
Further testimonial material could be marshaled to indicate that the stage model of the 
creative process is broadly consistent with the experience and creative work processes of 
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at least some economists However, the present material is sufficient to indicate the 
viability of discussing the creative work of economists in terms of the stage model. 
Further progress may perhaps best be made by means of a series of interviews with 
practicing economists asking firstly open ended questions about how their creative 
process develops, and secondly to what extent they consider the Wallas and Wertheimer 
models to be representative of their processes - and if not, why not? However, such an 
extended interview is beyond the scope of the present project. 
The Wertheimer productive thinking model 
An overview of the Wertheimer productive thinking model 
 
The second major model of the creative process is due to Max Wertheimer (1945/1961). 
Wertheimer’s general framework for understanding creative work is in terms of a 
problem situation S1, “the situation in which the actual thought process starts” and a 
situation S2, “in which the process ends, the problem is solved”. The “productive thought 
process” consists of the process or steps between S1 and S2 denoted as follows: 
 
S1 . . . S2 
 
Wertheimer (1945/1961: 242) allowed for productive processes that have no definite 
goal, but merely improve a situation: 
 
S1 . . . 
 
Additionally (1945/1961: 242), there could be processes which do not start with a 
problem: 
 
. . . S2 
 
This is typical for example of creative work: 
 
. . . there are processes in which S1 plays little or no role. The process starts, as in some 
creative processes in art and music, by envisaging some features in an S2 that is to be created. 
The artist is driven towards its crystallization, concretisation, or full realization. 
Characteristically, the more or less clearly conceived structural whole -qualities of the thing to 
be created are determining in the process.. . . When ideas about the goal are somewhat vague, 
there may be two directions at work simultaneously – one working to get the central idea 
clearer, the other to get at the parts. (Wertheimer 1945/1961: 242) 
 
In general therefore, there may be prior elaboration of the structure and situation before 
S1, and further elaboration and development after S2 so that generally stated, the 
productive work process becomes: 
 
. . . S1 . . . S2 . . . 
 
Wertheimer summarises this process in general terms: 
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Productive processes are often of this nature: in the desire to get at real understanding, 
questioning and investigation start. A certain region in the field becomes crucial, is focused; 
but it does not become isolated. A new, deeper structural view of the situation develops, 
involving changes in the functional meaning, the grouping, etc. of the items. Directed by 
what is required of the structure of a situation for a crucial region, one is led to a reasonable 
prediction, which – like the other parts of the structure – calls for verification, direct or 
indirect. 
Two directions are involved: getting a whole consistent picture, and seeing what the structure 
of the whole requires for the parts. (Wertheimer 1945/1961: 212) 
 
Wertheimer introduces several more specific theses regarding the productive thinking 
process, including: (i) that the productive thinking process involves a restructuring of the 
problem situation, and, more generally the framework in which the problem situation is 
understood, (ii) that the structural constraints in a problem, task or situation impose 
almost inevitable lines of force or tension leading to restructuring of the problem or task 
situation, and (iii) that there is a ‘whole-part’ relationship where the demands of the parts 
shape the structure and evolution of the whole’ and the demands of the whole shape the 
restructuring of the parts.  
 
Wertheimer suggested that the productive thought process involves a restructuring of the 
problem situation: 
 
S1, as compared with S2, is structurally incomplete, involves a gap or structural trouble, 
whereas S2 is in these respects structurally better, the gap is filled adequately, the structural 
trouble has disappeared, it is sensibly complete as compared against S1. When the problem is 
realized, S1 contains structural strains and stresses that are resolved in S2.  (Wertheimer 
1945/1961: 238) 
 
It is not, however, just the formulation of the problem that is reworked, it is also the 
mental framework of understanding – the ‘gestalt,’ so to speak, through which the 
problem situation is understood – that is also restructured and evolved: 
 
In real thinking processes, items often do not remain rigidly identical; and as a matter of fact, 
precisely their change, their improvement, is required. If an item, concept or proposition, 
recurs in the process and appears from an atomistic point of view as identical, it very often is 
not really so. It’s functional and structural meaning has actually, and fortunately, changed. 
(Wertheimer 1945/1961: 259) 
 
This transformation may be a form of ‘gestalt shift 7’ or ‘mental revolution’: 
                                                 
7 It may be digressing from the letter of Wertheier’s terminology, but the term ‘gestalt shift’ that 
Wertheimer used primarily to denote visual shifts in perception is used here to indicate shifts in the mental 
framework within and through which the problem situation is understood. The term gestalt shift is used 
here analogously to the term paradigm shift in Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  As noted above, 
it is quite clear that the concept of such a mental shift is present in Wertheimer’s writings, so this is not an 
issue of content, only of terminology. I am perhaps however taking some liberties by referring to this shift 
or of underlying mental framework through which the problem is viewed as a ‘gestalt shift,’ but on the 
other hand it highlights nicely the parallels between such shifts in Wertheimer’s model and paradigm shifts 
in Kuhn’s model. These parallels are further explored in chapter V. 
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. . . when the initial situation is not grasped either because it is too complex, too confusing, or 
because it appears in a simple but cheap, superficial structure, a transition is required first. 
The situation must be structurally understood so that the problem is grasped in its structural 
role as part of the given situation. Often this transformation actually explodes, revolutionizes 
the old view of S1.  (Wertheimer 1945/1961: 239) 
 
Wertheimer suggests that the problem situation S1 in itself sets up dynamics leading 
towards productive work: 
 
The thesis is that the very character of the steps, of the operations, of the changes between S1 
and S2 springs from the nature of these vectors set up in these structural troubles in the 
direction of helping the situation, of straightening it out structurally. (Wertheimer 1945/1961: 
238) 
 
There is a whole-part relationship where the parts are determined by the whole and also 
participate in determining the evolution and nature of the whole: 
 
S2 is a state of affairs that is held together by inner forces as a good structure in which the 
parts are determined by the structure of the whole, as the whole is by the parts. (Wertheimer 
1945/1961:239) 
 
This whole-part relationship was corroborated in contemporary investigation of the 
creative process, such as for example by Patrick (1941): 
 
The primacy of the whole over the parts is apparent in the last two stages. When the idea 
becomes definite for the first time . . . it is a general idea, and we can saw that the whole 
precedes the parts, for the details are added later in the final stages of revision. . . . the idea 
which is first written or sketched . . . is a general one. In the last stage of revision the 
attention is chiefly focused on details or parts. (Patrick 1941: 131) 
 
Sometimes a part develops into a whole, which then leads to a focus on parts in revision: 
 
In many cases the primacy of the whole over the part is apparent from the beginning of the 
task to write a poem or draw a picture. In other cases, however, the idea of the whole 
develops from a detail or part . . . which idea of the whole in turn precedes the parts or details 
brought out in revision. (Patrick 1941: 131) 
 
Wertheimer does not hold that the productive thinking process he describes is the only 
process through which useful results can develop through. Wertheimer for example 
contrasts the productive thinking process with 
 
. . . processes in which some steps, some operations coming from various sources and going 
in various directions, may lead to the solution in a fortuitous, zigzag way. (Wertheimer 
1945/1961: 238) 
 
Wertheimer explicitly lists a spectrum of productive thinking process: firstly alpha 
processes, which are the productive thinking processes involved in  
 
. . . S1 . . . S2 . . . 
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described by Wertheimer. Secondly beta processes, which are essentially alpha 
productive thinking processes except that “some of the items needed for progress, or 
some of the operations, may drop in externally, by chance, by external analogy, by mere 
recall, or as a result of blind trying” (1945/1961: 245). At the other extreme are gamma 
processes, where “the solution, is brought about by sheer chance discovery or merely by a 
succession of blind trials, by sheer external recall, sheer reliance on blind repetition, by 
blind drill or by prompting” (1945/1961: 245). 
Critical reflections on the Wertheimer productive thinking model 
 
Among the many critical points of discussion that could be raised in relation to the 
Wertheimer productive thinking model, two points should be made that are particularly 
pertinent to the present thesis.  
 
Firstly, Wertheimer’s account involved the structure of a problem setting up ‘vectors’ of 
force, almost inevitably pushing the researcher in certain lines. For Wertheimer, 
structural aspects become causes in the productive thinking process (1945/1961: 230) so 
that the nature of the process is that the steps in the process are structurally determined 
(1945/1961: 240). This raises questions of what degree of inevitability there is in the 
structural situation and of the role of the particular individual thinker in finding or 
determining these lines of force or ‘vectors’ of direction along which the problem 
situation is explored and restructured. Wertheimer did explicitly allow for the role of the 
individual personality in the creative work process: 
 
The forces in the situation may be of two kinds. In many instances it is the structural nature 
of the objective situation which essentially determines the vectors and the steps while the I, 
the ego, and his personal interests and tendencies play only a small role, or none at all . . . 
There are other cases in which personal needs are the source of the problem. Here  the I plays 
an important role. But . . . in order to really solve a problem, a transformation is often needed 
first . . . [into] the objective structural requirements. (Wertheimer 1945/1961: 241) 
 
While Wertheimer’s model allows for the individual personality, it does not however 
answer questions such as how different experience, disposition, personal styles, personal 
cognitive dispositions or tendencies, or other personal factors impact on and relate to the 
supposedly inevitable lines of force. Presumably, the lines of reaction to the structural 
problem depend not only on the problem, but also on the predisposition of the researcher 
to positively or negatively even consider lines of inquiry. Schroedinger or Einstein, 
presented with a problem situation in physics, might have initially be inclined to proceed 
in quite different directions in approaching the problem, indeed Gerald Holton 
(1973/1988; 1978/1998) has argued that indeed this is the case: different scientists have 
different ‘themata’ or paradigmatic commitments and orientational worldviews, which 
would lead the scientists to pursue different directions given the same problem situation. 
The ‘vector’ of productive work given a particular problem situation and a particular 
creative agent might therefore be viewed as being partially determined by the structure of 
the problem situa tion (as highlighted by Wertheimer), but, in initial attempts at least, also 
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partially determined by the dispositions, experience and orientational understandings of 
the particular creative agent or agents doing the productive work. 
 
Secondly, Wertheimer’s productive thinking process model allows for not only a 
restructuring of the mental framework or ‘gestalt’ of the researcher, but also the needs or 
normative goals of the thinker. That is, implicit or explicit goals or aspirations may be 
included in the initial situation S1, and the situation S2 may meet that need or goal with 
the situation S2 regarded as being more structurally sound or complete with respect to that 
need, so that the structural “gap” or tension generated by the need or goal in S1 is 
resolved in S2. This raises an ambiguity in exactly by what criteria S2 is regarded as more 
complete and satisfactory than S1. It may be for example that S2 is a more logically 
complete and objectively correct problem situation but fails to meet the personal needs 
implicit or explicit in S1 or, conversely, S2 might meet those needs adequately but leave 
the problem situation logically unimproved or in a worse situation. Such questions might 
be answered in terms of the subjective priorities of the agent involved in the productive 
thinking process or in more objective terms as the work is published and disseminated, 
but might be seen from a number of different perspectives simultaneously as S2 being 
more or less satisfactory than S1 according to quite different perspectives and criteria of 
assessment. 
The Wertheimer productive thinking model and economists: a case study 
of Léon Walras 
 
Having considered Wertheimer’s model as presented by Wertheimer, it is useful to 
consider Wertheimer’s model in relation to testimonial material in relation to the work 
processes of practicing economists. 
 
As noted above in discussing the stage model of the creative process, there is a 
considerable paucity of material involving economists discussing their creative work 
processes. Additionally, to assess the relevance of the Wertheimer model, a significant 
level of detail is needed regarding the actions and thoughts of the agent during the 
process of creative work, the kind of material that really only becomes available through 
a case study of specific works with access to notes and other resources or through access 
to the scholar in an interview format, focusing on the development of one or more key 
works and the intellectual development of the scholar. Consequently, it is difficult to 
assess the applicability of the Wertheimer productive thinking model to the creative work 
processes of economists from citing comments and testimonials from economists 
themselves.  
 
In order to proceed, it is necessary therefore to turn to the study of manuscripts and notes 
made available from the work of at least one significant economist. One such suitable 
collection of documents are the notes and papers of Léon Walras, collated and studied by 
William Jaffé (1965). As Jaffé (1972) notes: 
 
Fortunately, Léon Walras left to posterity a mass of documents, besides shedding additional 
light on the genesis of the “marginal revolution,” constitute excellent material for a case 
study of the process of scientific discovery. (Jaffé 1972: 387) 
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In addition, Jaffé makes it clear that an understanding of Walras’s creative process calls 
for some other explanation than a stage model account of flashes of illumination: 
 
The story thus unfolded does not, alas, possess high dramatic qualities. We do not have a 
case here where a fundamentally novel theory occurred to the discoverer in a single 
illuminating flash nor one in which the discoverer appears congenitally endowed with 
serendipity in any measure. On the contrary, Léon Walras’s path towards his solution of the 
problem of exchange value was long and tedious. (Jaffé 1972: 388) 
 
It would seem therefore that Walras’s process of discovery would potentially make a 
suitable case study for exploring the relevance of the Wertheimer productive thinking 
model to the creative work processes of an actual historically significant economist. 
Unfortunately, space will not allow consideration of further economists in the present 
discussion. 
 
Jaffé (1972) has considered Walras’s process of discovery and development in some 
detail. It is sufficient for the present purposes to consider some of the major features, and 
then consider the extent to which the Wertheimer model provides an appropriate 
framework in which to locate and understand Walras’s work. 
 
The first elements of the creative process to consider are the formative influences on 
Léon Walras. These include Léon Walras’s early engineering study at the École des 
Mines, the influence and prior work of Léon’s father Auguste Walras, and Auguste and 
Léon Walras’s combined reading of and assimilation of existing economic thought, 
including a number of specific influences, particularly the pioneering work of Augustin 
Cournot.  
 
Walras himself acknowledges his debt to the influences of his father and of Cournot: 
 
I am indebted to my father, Auguste Walras, for the fundamental principles of my economic 
doctrine; and to Augustin Cournot for the idea of using the calculus of functions in the 
elaboration of this doctrine. (Walras 1877/1954: 37) 
 
Considering Léon Walras’s training at the École des Mines, Walras was exposed in the 
course of this study to teaching in statics and mechanics. Although Walras was not an 
exceptional student, Walras was deeply influenced by the mathematical beauty and power 
of the physical mechanics he was exposed to. Ingrao and Israel for example note that: 
 
Walras’s early reading consolidated his boundless enthusiasm for Newtonian astronomy and 
the solid edifice of classical mechanics, which he regarded as unequalled models of scientific 
knowledge throughout his life . . . it was in those years that he read with great enthusiasm 
Poinsot’s Elements of Statics (Ingrao and Israel 1987/1990: 88) 
 
Jaffé (1960; 1965: vol 3 149-150, letter 1483, n. 7) has argued that Walras took the 
conception and framework of general equilibrium from the second chapter of Poinsot’s 
book, and from a memoir entitled “General theory of equilibrium and motion of 
systems.” Concerning his Economique et Mécanique, Walras wrote to a student noting 
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“the perfect similarity 1. between our formula of maximum satisfaction with the formula 
of the equilibrium of the Roman balance and 2. between our equations of general 
equilibrium with the equations of universal gravity” (Ingrao and Israel 1987/1990: 90). 
 
Following Jaffé, a substantial case may be made that Walras’s early training at the École 
des Mines exposed Walras to a mathematical and physical metaphor that was to guide his 
work throughout his life.  
 
The influence of Léon Walras’s father Auguste Walras cannot be overstated. Auguste 
Walras bequeathed to Léon several convictions that were to guide Léon Walras’s work, 
in particular the notion that economic science can and should be a mathematical science, 
secondly the notion of rareté and the conviction that rareté must play a central role in the 
theory of exchange. Auguste Walras had also undertaken considerable exploratory work, 
considering the problem from a variety of points of view and in relation to existing 
economic theories. 
 
Auguste Walras had attempted to make the common-sense notion of rareté as scarcity 
more precise by defining it as the ratio of a number of persons desiring a good (each 
person assumed to want no more than a single unit of a good) to the total quantity of the 
good. Auguste Walras however later discerened a commensurability problem in the first 
part of the ratio, and concluded that until this conceptual difficulty was surmounted, 
economics could not become a mathematical science. This was the state in which Léon 
Walras ‘inherited’ the problem from his father: 
 
It was the challenge implicit in his father’s conclusion which incited Léon to long labors that 
eventuated in his marginal utility theory. As Léon was the first to acknowledge, he owed 
much to his father for having adumbrated the problem, but it is evident that he could not 
possibly have attained to any conception at all of marginal utility by following his father’s 
reasoning. (Jaffé 1972: 389) 
 
There were a number of minor influences on the development of Walras’s thought, such 
as for example the work of Burlamaqui, Genovesi, Turgot, Condillac, and Nassau Senior 
(Jaffé 1972: 390-392). Auguste Walras had “consulted the principal economic treatises, 
both French and English” (Jaffé 1972: 388) and it would normally be reasonable to 
suppose that Léon Walras did likewise. Schumpeter (1954) however has suggested that 
while Léon Walras read and absorbed the French intellectual tradition inc luding 
Condillac, Turgot, Quesnay, and Biosguilbert, primarily through the lens of reading Say 
and his influences, Walras was not much influenced by English political economy: 
Walras “paid conventional respect to A. Smith. The rest of the great Englishmen meant 
little to him” (Schumpeter 1954: 828). Walras of course (see Walras 1877/1954: 36) 
formally stated that he was not aware, while developing or his Eléments, of Jevons’s 
(1871/1888) publication of Jevons’s Theory of Political Economy.  
 
Jaffé suggests that none of this reading was particularly influential in guiding Walras to 
the formulation of his marginal utility theory: 
 
For all their penetrating insight into the bearing of scarcity on value and price, neither 
Burlamaqui, nor Genovesi, nor Turgot, nor Condillac, nor Nassau Senior, all authors whom 
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Walras had apparently read at an early stage, can be said to have offered a likely lead to 
anything like a rigorous formulation of the theory of marginal utility. They never sharpened 
their argument to a fine analytical point; their disquisitions on value were even more 
discursive than those of Auguste Walras. (Jaffé  1972: 392) 
 
Jaffé concludes: 
 
We are left, therefore, with no alternative but to search for suggestions in Léon Walras’s 
manuscripts and worksheets. (Jaffé 1972: 392) 
 
Jaffé therefore starts with a manuscript denoted by Walras as the “1’ère Tentative.” Jaffé 
summarises:  
 
The whole effort centered around a labored attempt to assign meaning to the proposition that 
“the price of things is in inverse ratio to the quantity offered and in direct ratio to the quantity 
demanded” where quanitity offered was defined as the total existing quantity in the 
possession of the several individuals in the world considered and the quantity demanded as 
the sum total of their wants or needs . . . Auguste Walras’s quasi-mathematical definition of 
rareté upon which his argument was founded led him completely astray. (Jaffé 1972: 392-
393)  
 
The next manuscript, the “2’ème Tentative,”  was 
 
. . . quite different and shows that in the interval . . . he had made considerable progress in 
shaping the structural pattern  of his general equilibrium model (Jaffé 1972: 393, italics 
added) 
 
However,  
 
This did not dampen his misconceived resolve . . . to prove Cournot wrong in dismissing as 
meaningless the ratio of the quantity demanded of a commodity to the quantity offered. Léon 
Walras still clung to his father’s idea of rareté, which he expressed as the ratio of the utility 
of a commodity for all consumers taken together to the total quantity of that commodity in 
existence – though now with a shade less confidence. (Jaffé 1972: 394) 
 
Jaffé summarises the state of play at this point: 
 
It was this mixed bag of bungled mathematical economics and fruitful insights that Léon 
Walras brought with him when he arrived at Lausanne in December 1870 to take up his post 
as professor of economics. There was certainly nothing in that bag which would point to his 
eventual role as a marginal revolutionist, except his dogged persistence in trying to make 
sense of his father’s rareté. (Jaffé 1972: 394) 
 
By 1872, Walras had made progress in assembling the machinery of his mathematical 
general equilibrium model, but he had not yet succeeded in integrating rareté into his 
model. The turning point was reached in 1872 due to a question asked by Léon Walras to 
a colleague, Paul Piccard, who furnished Walras with “the simplest analytical tools 
required for establishing the condition of maximum satisfaction for a trader.” Jaffé 
observes: 
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Unquestionably, it was from Piccard’s mathematical demonstration that Léon Walras 
distilled his refined and analytically tractable conception of marginal utility. (Jaffé 1972: 
398) 
 
This insight was succeeded by an integration of Piccard’s insight – and of rareté – into 
Walras’s framework and an elaboration of the theory into a complete and presentable 
publishable whole.  
 
We now have therefore a high level, broad overview of Walras’s process of creative 
discovery. Some useful observations can be immediately drawn from such a high level 
overview. If we represent the creative discovery process broadly as  
 
. . . S1  . . . S2 . . . S3 . . . S4 
 
where S1 is the problem situation as left by Auguste Walras and taken up by Léon 
Walras, and S2 is the final restructured problem situation published by Léon Walras in his 
Elements, then   
 
. . . S1 
 
represents the initial creative work process of Auguste Walras in formulating and 
restructuring the problem, and  
 
  . . . S2 
 
represents the further work on and restructuring of the problem situation by Léon Walras 
up and until he reached Laussane. 
 
. . . S3 . . . 
 
represents the work Walras continued to put into the project in Laussane up to and until 
Piccard’s contribution, which triggered a significant restructuring of the work and 
Walras’s integration of the concept of rareté into his essentially Newtonian equilibrium 
framework. Finally,  
 
. . . S4 
 
represents the final integration and structuring of this insight into the work and the 
restructuring and shaping of the completed work for publication. 
 
It may then be noted that the final situation S4 involves a reformulation of not only the 
intellectual product into the eventual form published in Walras’s Elements, but also the 
way rareté is conceptualised and integrated into the general framework. We can therefore 
identify following the contribution of Paul Piccard a ‘gestalt shift,’ a transformation and 
restructuring in both Walras’s formulation of the intellectual product and in the way that 
the problem situation is conceptualised.   
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Two additional themes are immediately evident in reviewing Walras’s process of creative 
work. Firstly, as noted above, physical mechanics clearly played a significant role in 
providing a conscious metaphor for elaborating a mathematical model of economic 
exchange. The application of such a guiding metaphor seems to have been both 
consciously deliberate and extensive. Secondly, there seemed to have been certain ‘hard 
core’ paradigmatic presuppositions that guided Walras’s work, most particularly the 
notion that economics can be usefully developed as a mathematical science and a 
conviction of the central role of rareté. It was only with a restructuring of the central 
concept of rareté, a ‘gestalt switch’ or ‘paradigm shift,’ that Walras was able to integrate 
rareté or marginal ut ility with his mathematical framework. 
 
It would of course be highly relevant and interesting for assessing the relevance of the 
Wertheimer model to return to Walras’s notes and closely study the evolution of specific 
elements of Walras’s theory over time in much greater detail noting the dynamics and 
logic of this restructuring and evolution, and consider this evolution in terms of logical 
necessity and vectors of change as described in Werthemer’s theory. Such a study is 
however beyond the scope of the present work, for reasons of both time and space. 
 
In concluding the case study therefore, it appears that Walras’s creative work is broadly 
compatible with a Wertheimer account of the creative process, and indeed at least one 
‘gestalt switch’ or restructuring of both the conceptual framework the problem situation 
is understood in and the problem situation itself can be identified. This gestalt switch or 
restructuring was triggered by an external contribution, seemingly acting as a catalyst for 
a transformation of existing psychic material and intellectual content, in a manner 
reminiscent of Hutchinson’s (1949) stage model theory. It appears likely that further and 
more detailed study would reveal more of the kind of dynamics of discovery posited by 
Wertheimer, and in addition the case study strongly reveals a significant role for 
metaphor or analogy, in this case with the physical sciences, and of orientational 
‘thematic’ or ‘paradigmatic’ convictions or viewpoints.  
Conclusions 
 
The two dominant classical models of the creative process, the Wallas stage model and 
the Wertheimer productive thing model, have been reviewed and related to the creative 
work practices of professional economists. From readily available testimonial material 
and manuscripts, it appears that there is a good fit between both of the Wallas and 
Wertheimer models and the creative work processes of professional economists.  
 
However, further work in the form of interviews with and surveys of professional 
economists would be useful to further explore the creative work processes used by 
economists, in particular the extent to which professional economists hold the Wallas and 
Wertheimer models to be useful and relevant accounts of their own creative processes 
and describing other aspects of their creative processes that they might consider to be 
important. Similarly, there is scope for further work examining the manuscripts and 
working notes of economists such as Léon Walras to examine on a finer level of detail 
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the extent to which the Wertheimer model is a useful account of the processes involved in 
such creative work. 
 
The present chapter has made an original and useful contribution to the literature in not 
only summarizing the dominant creative process models in the psychology of creativity 
literature but also relating those models to the work practices of actual professional 
economists - thereby making this literature accessible to economists. 
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